In this paper, I address a key argument in favour of logical expressivism, the view that knowing a logical principle such as Modus Ponens is not a cognitive state but a pro-attitude towards drawing certain types of conclusions from certain types of premises. The argument is that logical expressivism is the only view that can take us out of Lewis Carroll's Regress -which suggests that elementary deductive reasoning is impossible. I show that the argument does not hold scrutiny and that logical cognitivism can be vindicated. In the course of the discussion, I draw substantially on a comparison with a similar argument in meta-ethics, for moral expressivism.
Given that I am comparing two complex discussions -one in meta-ethics, the other in the philosophy of logic -in a relatively short space, the discussion will be inevitably broad-brush.
But I hope that it will serve to show the similarities and differences between the moral and the logical cases.
Moral Expressivism
A key argument for non-cognitivism in meta-ethics starts with the combination of the Humean theory of motivation and moral motivational internalism:
Humean Theory of Motivation
Cognitive states, such as beliefs, cannot motivate on their own.
Pro-attitudes, such as desire states or dispositions, can motivate on their own.
Moral Motivational Internalism
There is an internal or necessary link between moral judgment and motivation to act in accordance with that judgment.
The Humean theory of motivation is taken as an analytic claim about the nature of cognitive states and non-cognitive pro-attitudes, paradigmatically about the nature of belief and desire.
Beliefs represent the world but on their own do not lead to action; desires are nonrepresentational states that lead to action. The Humean theory of motivation is deeply entrenched. For instance, it underpins the idea that beliefs and desires have different directions of fit: the first have a world to mind direction of fit (they aim to 'fit' the world by representing it), whereas the latter have a mind to world direction of fit (they aim to make the world 'fit' them by changing it). 2 It also underpins the Davidsonian account of intentional actionexplanation in terms of beliefs and desires. 3 Moral motivational internalism is a theory about the role played by moral judgments in our mental and practical lives. It starts with the observation that people are motivated to act according to their moral judgments and results in the idea that it is their moral judgments themselves that motivate them in acting. 4 That we are motivated to act according to our moral judgments -in a strong, reliable or stable fashion -is taken to be a robust datum; and according to many, moral motivational internalism is the best explanation of this datum. If you judge that you ought not to eat meat, then the fact that you are motivated not to eat meat should be explained in terms of your judgment itself, rather than further desires you may or may not have with regard to eating meat. In a slightly regimented form, this can be put as follows:
Simple Internalism: Necessarily, if a person judges that she morally ought to φ, then she is (at least somewhat) motivated to φ. 5 The people at issue here are intended to be rational and strong-willed; those whose motivation is not defeated by mental illness, apathy, or akrasia. The moral judgment only 'somewhat' motivates because it can be defeated by competing demands or norms that override motivation in a particular context. For instance, my motivation not to eat meat might be defeated by a desire not to starve or not to break norms of etiquette. 6 One key piece of evidence for motivational internalism is the fact that people undergo a change in their motivation if they change their moral views even when all other motivational states are 2 The distinction was made popular by Elizabeth, G. M. Anscombe, Intention (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1957) . See Michael A. Smith, The Moral Problem (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1994) for its connection to the Humean Theory of Motivation. See Lloyd Humberstone, 'Directions of Fit', Mind 101(401) (1992), 59-83 for a discussion of its role in various philosophical contexts. 3 See Donald Davidson, 'Actions, Reasons and Causes', The Journal of Philosophy 60 (1963), 685-700. 4 Smith, op. cit. note 2, 60ff. I set aside the view according to which it is a desire-like state necessarily connected to the judgment that motivates but not strictly speaking the judgment itself. I also set aside the issue of whether it is really moral judgments rather than the moral facts those judgments are about that ultimately motivate. These won't matter for our discussion. 5 Gunnar Björnsson et al., 'Motivational Internalism', Gunnar Björnsson, Caj Strandberg, Ragnar Francén Olinder, John Eriksson, and Fredrik Björklund (eds), Motivational Internalism, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 1. 6 There is a plethora of formulations of internalism, many of which are weaker or conditional, so as to allow for proper qualifications as to the kinds of agents (rational, psychologically normal, morally perceptive, etc. that are at issue). These need not concern us here but see op. cit. note 5. kept equal. 7 While motivational externalists, who believe that the link between judgment and motivation is extrinsic or contingent, could explain this in terms of a change of view causing a change of desire and motivation, internalists think that the link has to be more direct. 8 By contrast, one key argument against motivational internalism, discussed in section 5.4, concerns the possibility of amoralism. The amoralist is someone who endorses a moral judgment, is rational and strong-willed, but does not feel motivated in the least to act according to that judgment, even when other things are equal. Internalists are committed to saying that the amoralist is a kind of conceptual impossibility: the amoralist is ultimately irrational or incompetent (in lacking mastery of key normative concepts), or insincere in their moral judgments. 9 Someone who judges that they ought not to eat meat but, other things being equal, is not motivated not to eat meat is either irrational or insincere or incompetent. Externalists by contrast can explain the amoralist as someone who, while competently making the relevant normative judgment, simply lacks the desire to act accordingly.
Given Humean theory of motivation and moral motivational internalism, an argument for moral This sketch of moral motivational internalism, moral non-cognitivism and the kind of noncognitive expressivism (henceforth: 'expressivism') that can be tied to them, will suffice as background to our discussion of Carroll's Regress and logical non-cognitivism and logical expressivism.
Carroll's Regress
Carroll's Regress seems to suggest that elementary deductive reasoning is impossible: we cannot reason from premises to conclusion of simple valid arguments. This is plainly absurd.
Below is a version of the Regress that Carroll offers in a letter to the Editor of Mind, George Stout, dated August 25 1894. 16 Carroll had submitted his article and Stout had asked for clarifications. Carroll offers a brief statement of the Regress, which is helpful for the present discussion because it ties it clearly to normative notions and in particular to that of obligation. It helps make perspicuous why Carroll's Regress might be interpreted as a regress that supports a kind of non-cognitive logical expressivism. Here is what Carroll writes:
For instance if I grant:
(1) All men are mortal, and Socrates is a man, but not
(2) the sequence 'If all men are mortal and if Socrates is a man, then Socrates is mortal' is valid.
Then I do not grant:
(3) Socrates is mortal.
Hence before granting (3), I must grant (1) and (2).
We may write this a fortiori (viz. 'Before granting (3) I must grant (1) (ii) It is day Therefore:
(iii) It is light.
What is assumed in the Regress is that, given the validity of this argument, the normative situation is the following: if I grant (i) and (ii), I am thereby obliged to grant (iii).
The puzzle seems to arise from the fact that I fail to recognize, and be moved by, this obligation because there is something that I fail to see or accept that would enable me to do so. On this interpretation, the challenge is to articulate what a subject who recognises this obligation -and is moved by it -sees or accepts, that makes them reason from (i) and (ii) to (iii). It is widely agreed amongst commentators that this suggestion is a bad one -and rightly so. 19 It triggers the Regress: adding (Cond) as a premise is an invitation to add yet another conditional as a premise with (i), (ii) and (Cond) as antecedents and (iii) as consequent.
More precisely, it is widely agreed that Carroll makes two mistakes: first, he suggests that this conditional (Cond) would be the right sort of thing to consider for someone who is not moved by the obligation to reason from (i) and (i) to (iii); second, he invites us to add (Cond) as a premise to the original argument. Thus it seems that to block Carroll's Regress we should appeal to something different from the conditional (Cond), which merely states a logical fact.
We should appeal to something that cannot become a premise in one's reasoning and that has the right kind of relation to our obligation to reason from (i) and (ii) to (iii). The thought is that if someone accepted (Ought), they would be better placed to reason from (i) and (ii) to (iii) than if they accepted (Cond). 21
A Two-Fold Proposal to Block Carroll's Regress
Why is that? After all, (Ought) is just another conditional. Why then isn't it just like accepting another premise? Here, a thought that has attracted many can be put in a slogan: Logic Makes the Mind Move. Roughly, the thought is that my accepting or knowing a principle such as (Ought) is having a type of knowledge that encompasses the idea that my accepting the premises: makes me 'move' or 'travel' to the conclusion; or 'generates' my acceptance of the conclusion; or 'guides' me to the conclusion; or 'compels' me to accept the conclusion. 22
While I will discuss below whether (Ought) is the right principle to invoke, to fix ideas, . For a recent defence of the claim that logical norms are imperatives see Hartry Field, 'Epistemology from an Evaluativist Perspective', Philosophers' Imprint 18(12), (2018), 12ff. The difference between these two ways of thinking about logical principles of reasoning will not matter here. 22 Many philosophers think that we can know logical principles such as Modus Ponens, or, at any rate, they take themselves to be specifying the conditions for knowing a logical principle, or the form that such knowledge would take. I will thus follow the orthodoxy in focusing on knowledge. 23 I can only really sketch these views here and cannot do justice to their sophistications and differences. Slogans are convenient, but simplifying, and I hope that this one is not so simplifying as to misrepresent any of these views. See op. cit. note 17 for a fuller discussion of some of them. 24 Op. cit. note 19.
premises in reasoning and they get us out of Carroll's Regress: in the relevant circumstances, when you have accepted the premises, you will simply reason to the conclusion.
More recently, some have appealed to the slogan as part as a discussion of the justification of basic logical principles. and so as that of how logical principles of reasoning can motivate. Although he does not settle on a precise account of logical knowledge, he suggests that the Regress shows that knowledge of logical principles of reasoning cannot be propositional, if it is to be fit for this job; hence that it has to involve either logical concepts conceived as dispositions or some dispositional knowledge. 33 Only then can logic make the mind move and get us out of Carroll's Regress.
Simon Blackburn takes the problem raised by the Regress to be about whether logic can 'make the mind move', or how to describe someone who always has 'space to refrain from drawing the conclusion'. 34 His view, explicitly presented as Humean, is that there has to be a movement of the will, which is not 'under the control of fact or reason, [it] has to be given as a brute extra, if deliberation is ever to end by determining the will'. Blackburn is more interested in addressing issues to do with practical reasoning -the 'Practical Tortoise' -rather than theoretical reasoning, but I take it that, by reasonable extrapolation, we can understand him to offer the following kind of diagnosis of the Regress: the failure to reason from (i) and (ii) to (iii) (plus all the extra premises one might wish to add) is a form of akrasia and so judgments such as (Ought) must essentially be tied to desires to reason in certain ways. 35 Let me elaborate on three aspects concerning the two-fold proposal just sketched -involving (Ought) and Logic Makes the Mind Move -that are important for the ensuing discussion.
First, one theme is that what is required to block the Regress is that logic makes the mind move,
where that means that there is no space for reflection or judgment between accepting the premises and drawing the conclusion: the movement is immediate. There is no gap between the relevance of the principle being salient (once the relevant premises have been accepted) and the 31 This gives rise to normative requirements (rather than weaker 'normative recommendations'), such that if you believe the premises and not the conclusion, 'you are definitely not entirely as you ought to be'; perhaps you are irrational.
In light of these remarks, the two-fold proposal, then, is this. First, what a subject who reasons from (i) and (ii) to (iii) relies on is their knowledge of (Ought*): when they have accepted (i) and (ii) and, other things are equal, they are strictly required to accept (iii). Second, Logic
Makes the Mind Move: logical principles of reasoning such as (Ought*) are accepted or known in such a way that, when the premises have been accepted and other things are equal, one seamlessly, unreflectively, moves to the conclusion. This requires the acceptance or knowledge not to be a propositional state; a proposal that has been favoured is to construe such acceptance or knowledge as a disposition. Thus, if logic makes the mind move, then once I have accepted the premises, I will never be stuck, wondering which conditional of the form of (Cond) to accept as a premise to my reasoning. I will just reason to (iii).
Logical Expressivism
A natural way of articulating the two-fold proposal is in terms of motivational internalism: it is my very knowledge of (Ought*) that motivates me to reason to a conclusion (iii), once I have accepted (i) and (ii). My knowledge of (Ought*) is in this sense intrinsically motivational. If so, this puts us in the territory of the argument (a) -(d) of section 1, and it is then relatively easy to see how such logical motivational internalism leads to a kind of logical expressivism. So let us state the argument for logical non-cognitivism as follows, in a way that parallels the argument Carroll's Regress is discussed in the context of internalist accounts of epistemic justification and the question of whether these accounts could apply to the justification logical principles of reasoning. The issue is often presented as a stark choice between internalist accounts, whereby we have explicit propositional justification for logical principles (on which regresses arise, and so action is impossible); and forms of reliabilism, on which justification is merely a matter of having reliable dispositions to reason (which make action possible but which fail to do justice to the way that knowing logic is meant to be rational or reasonable or epistemically responsible).
Again, it is clearly presupposed that we need to rely on other states to explain the possibility of First, it is important to distinguish the logical expressivism at issue here from another view that is widespread in logic, which is tied to the semantics for the logical constants (e.g. 'if, then').
On this kind of expressivism (which originates in Wittgenstein's Tractatus, and has recently been developed by Robert Brandom), the logical constants do not simply represent (e.g. truthfunctions) but are records of practices of reasoning -i.e. the meanings of the logical constants 42 There is more to be said about this characterization of logical cognitivism to which I come back in section 6. are given in pragmatic terms. 43 This kind of expressivism has little to do with the Humean theory of motivation and motivational internalism, which here are tied to expressions such as 'ought'; it also has little to do with Carroll's Regress but rather springs from specific semantic claims about the logical constants.
Second, according to Hartry Field, Carroll's Regress concerns the justification of basic logical principles, and shows that justification for the reasoning from (i) and (ii) to (iii) cannot come from (Cond) -or objective facts of validity. 44 Justification for logical principles comprises normative, perspectival features, and indeed the mistake behind Carroll's Regress is to presuppose factualism about validity, which somehow will transmit objective justification to our logical beliefs. Generally, the aim of epistemology is not to transmit (objective) justification, but to evaluate methods of forming and retaining beliefs. The view, then, is anti-realist, and articulated as expressivist, although Field prefers to call it 'evaluativism'. However, while it partly springs from an interpretation of Carroll's Regress, it is not driven by the concern to articulate how logic might make the mind move.
Crispin Wright also advocates a form of logical non-cognitivism, in part as a reaction to
Carroll's Regress, which he takes to presuppose logical cognitivism: the view that we possess basic logical knowledge that can be given factual justification. 45 His key thought is that we do not know basic logical principles because they are presupposed in -are a precondition of -any epistemic inquiry; we are simply rationally entitled to believe in basic logical principles. It is a mistake to try to justify putative propositional knowledge of such principles since we are pragmatically entitled to these prior to knowledge acquisition. 46 
Against Logical Motivational Internalism
One way of attacking the argument offered in (e) -(h) is to argue against the Humean Picture of Motivation: it is to argue that fully cognitive states can be motivational, and are not isolated from action in this way. Indeed there are many accounts of belief or cognitive states according to which beliefs are intrinsically characterised in term of their connection to action. 47 Finally, I briefly discuss the logical analog of the amoralist -the alogicalist -and compare them to the akratic.
The source of motivation in reasoning
Moral motivation is taken to be a robust, reliable phenomenon that needs to be explained. It is typically taken as a given that moral judgments motivate us or have a hold on us in a different way than non-normative ones. This is the case even though, for various reasons, we do not motivated. This requires explanation and opinions diverge on how to give one. But there is general agreement that moral judgment is a strong and stable source of motivation for moral action.
Does the same hold of logic? If logical motivational internalism is correct, my knowledge of (Ought*) plays an essential role in motivating my reasoning from premises such as (i) and (ii) to conclusions such as (iii). But are we reliably motivated to act by the logical principles that we accept or know? Is logic in this sense a source of motivation for action? We know that a positive answer may offer the prospect of blocking Carroll's Regress. But is this view in general true? I am inclined to respond negatively on the grounds that, typically, motivation for reasoning has its source in our cognitive and practical goals, and not in the methods we use to reach them. In the case of logic: motivation is not essentially or internally tied to logical knowledge. I submit that this case is typical. In general what motivates us to draw conclusions from premises of valid arguments is not the fact that these arguments are valid but the fact that we are interested in the conclusions of these arguments or that these conclusions have practical or theoretical value for us -typically related to truth or knowledge or the best/right course of action to take in given circumstances. Moreover, how we engage in reasoning is responsive to tits specific contents, as well as to other beliefs and bits of evidence we might have, and not so much to us knowing general patterns of reasoning sanctioned by logic. Principles such as Modus Ponens and (Ought*) are general principles and perhaps this is part of the reason why it is hard to see them as playing the key role in a story about motivation in a particular case of logical reasoning. In this, Modus Ponens and (Ought*) are very different from specific moral principles such as that one ought not to eat meat.
There are of course cases in which the goal itself is to reason logically or to prove something, as in the logic class. There, the point is to reason with logical principles, perhaps so as to learn how to better use them. But in most contexts what motivates us in engaging in deductive reasoning is other practical or theoretical goals. 48 For instance, in the ironing example used in the discussion of Harman in section 3, it seems that the reason why I refrain from reasoning to the belief that the news is on is my desire not to form a false belief: I have evidence that this belief would be false and so I do not want to use a method of reasoning that leads me to this false belief. As we saw, this case is one in which other things are not equal. But in the example of hiding Lucy's presents, other things are equal, and it does not seem that we should think of logic as playing the motivating role.
It thus seems that the motivating role of logical 'judgments' such as (Ought*) is nothing like the motivating role of moral judgments such as that one ought not to eat meat. What about the argument offered by moral motivational internalists in favour of their view: change in moral judgment directly (not through a change of desires) entails change in moral motivation? It is true that change of logical beliefs will entail change in ways to reason: classical logicians, dialethists and intuitionists reason in different ways and this is because they hold different general principles to be valid. It is in general true that if you take different facts or norms to hold, you will revise your actions accordingly. In the case of logic, as in the case of rain, I take it that this can be in large part explained in terms of our epistemic goals: we want to arrive at truth and knowledge and we will take the method that is the most conducive to these goals. It is thus apt, if anything, to attach motivation to these goals rather than to the methods used to attain them.
Motivating/explanatory reasons
We can expect that what motivates us to reason, just like what motivates us to act more generally, will figure in spelling out motivating/explanatory (M/E) reasons for reasoning or action. It is standard to appeal to (M/E) reasons to explain how a given action is rational or reasonable from the agent's point of view, i.e. to offer a psychological explanation of rational action, of why an agent acted the way they did. 49 Thus, knowledge of (Ought*) is typically not an M/E reason for reasoning according to Modus Ponens; it is rather presupposed by those reasons. While there might be strong reasons to think that someone's judgment that they ought not to steal typically explains why they refrain from stealing, someone's knowledge of (Ought*) does not typically explain why they draw particular conclusions from particular premises. 49 Maria Alvarez ('Reasons for Action, Acting for Reasons, and Rationality', Synthèse 195 (2018), 3293-3310) persuasively argues that, contrary to orthodoxy, we should distinguish between motivating and explanatory reasons. As nothing turns on their differences here, I will however lump them together. 50 The matter is more delicate than I can do justice here, for four broad reasons. First, M/E reasons might not be transparent to agents. Second, agents might have different modes of presentation for the judgment that they ought not to eat meat -some normative ('it's wrong') some not so ('I was raised vegetarian'). Thus, the normative judgment might not always be the primary answer to the why question, even though it is the ultimate or one of the ultimate M/E reasons. Third, there might be other norms (perhaps conversational norms, norms of politeness, propriety, etc.) in place in a given context that do not permit asserting the normative judgment as an answer to the why question. Fourth, the interaction between normative reasons and M/E reasons is complex (For discussion, see Smith op. cit. note 2, ch. 4). for me to e.g. gain a true belief or a bit of knowledge, then I ought to try to gain them; I ought to take the means to my end. From this perspective, the real normative drive does not come from logic; rather, why we sometimes feel that there is a strict ought in place, or that it would be irrational not to reason from premises to conclusion, comes from epistemic or practical norms.
More thoughts on ought
From this standpoint, then, a logical principle of reasoning derived from Modus Ponens need not be articulated in terms of obligation or indeed be intrinsically normative: normativity comes from our cognitive and practical goals, not so much from logic.
Amoralism, alogicalism and akrasia
Let us consider the figure of the amoralist, who is at issue between moral motivational internalists and moral motivational externalists. The amoralist would be someone who is rational, strong-willed, sincerely and competently makes the judgment that, e.g. they ought not argument against moral motivational internalism; we have someone who makes a moral judgment but is not in the least moved to act accordingly.
An alogicalist would be someone who is rational, strong-willed, e.g. knows Modus Ponens, but is not in the least motivated to reason from premises to conclusion (of simple, clear instances of Modus Ponens), even when other things are equal. For instance, they see, e.g. that (iii) follows from (i) and (ii), or see that if they believed (i) and (ii) and other things were equal, they would be required to believe (iii), but are not in the least motivated to engage in reasoning from (i) and
(ii) to (iii).
Here is a way of thinking of the alogicalist. Some scenarios seem unproblematic: e.g. accepting The view taken here is that it should not be read off facts of validity.
It thus seems that the alogicalist does not pose the same challenge to logical motivational internalism that the amoralist poses to moral motivational internalism. But this does not speak in favour of internalism, because the case of the alogicalist makes salient the extent to which any phenomenon of motivation in the context of logic is inherited from matters external to logic.
Some commentators on Carroll's Regress connect the Regress with the phenomenon of akrasia, rather than amoralism. 52 Crudely, the difference is this. The amoralist is strong-willed, even thought they are not motivated to act on their (moral) judgment. The akratic is weak-willed:
they make the (moral) judgment, have the relevant desire to act on that judgment, but fail to act.
Where the amoralist is not motivated at all (but would act if motivated), the akratic is motivated but fails to do what, all things considered, they wish to do: amoralism is indifference; akrasia is incontinence. Thus our moral akratic would be someone who judges that they ought not to eat meat, are motivated not to eat meat, all else is equal, but nonetheless eat meat; similarly, our logical akratic would be someone who knows (Ought*), has accepted (i) and (ii), is motivated to reason to (iii), all else is equal, but nonetheless does not reason to (iii).
It is common to think of akrasia as a form of irrationality, and for brevity I will stick to this interpretation. 53 We have noticed before the possibility of thinking of the agent who does not reason from (i) and (ii) to (iii) in the scenario offered by Carroll as irrational, as suggested by Broome's Strictness Test. Perhaps, then, this form of irrationality can be explained in terms of akrasia.
In the moral case, internalists and externalists might say different things about the amoralist and the akratic. But, as with the amoralist, internalists have a prima facie difficulty handling the akratic: if the link of judgment to motivation is internal, one must be somewhat motivated when one sincerely judges; if the link of judgment to motivation is internal, then, when all else is equal, one's motivation ought to issue in action. But this is precisely what does not happen with the akratic. If Carroll's Regress is about akrasia, then again logical motivational internalism seems to have less conceptual space to articulate an irrationality of this sort than its rival: it seems harder to articulate how it could exist. A motivational externalist view, whereby logic does not play a motivational role, where the connection between knowing (Ought*) and action is only contingent, is better equipped to address logical akrasia. In the same way, the externalist is prima facie better equipped to address akrasia in the moral case: if the connection of moral judgment to motivation is not internal, there is more conceptual space to articulate the possibility of akrasia. Besides showing that logical motivational internalism is incorrect, the discussion also reveals the following about interpreting Carroll's Regress as a regress concerning normativity, motivation and cognitivism. First, the Regress operates with the wrong normative undertone if it suggests that we articulate the normativity of logical principles of reasoning in terms of (Ought).
At least (Ought*) is required and, as I have suggested in section 5, it is an open question whether we should really think of logic as itself normative or only so by association with epistemic notions such as belief, truth or knowledge.
Second, the Regress wrongly invites us to seek a solution internal to logic as it were. This is initially manifest with the appeal to (Cond). If someone does not reason from (i) and (ii) to (iii), it is first suggested we add (Cond) as a premise -we appeal to a further logical fact to address our logical problem, thus seeking a solution internal to logic. In this sense, appeal to (Ought)/(Ought*), together with the Logic Makes the Mind Move view, is still seeking a solution internal to logic: through appealing to normative and psychological facts of motivation essentially tied to those logical facts.
Not only is it mistaken to seek a solution internal to logic, but there is also a simpler picture available, which brings in factors external to logic, such as our cognitive and practical goals. It seems that a proper explanation of why we engage in reasoning has to factor these in. This in itself makes the logical case quite different from the moral one, as, crudely put it is natural to think of morality not as a means to an end, but as an end in itself. Carroll's Regress as a puzzle about motivation might thus be better interpreted as a problem of failure to act on one's practical or theoretical goals.
Finally, let me sketch a cognitivist way to address Carroll's Regress. At the end on section 2, I alluded to the fact that it is widely agreed that Carroll makes two mistakes. First, he suggests that the conditional (Cond) would be the right sort of thing to consider for someone who is not moved by the obligation to reason from (i) and (ii) to (iii). Second, he invites us to add (Cond)
as a premise to the original argument from (i) and (ii) to (iii). While this diagnosis is right, this
should not lead us to make the presupposition that any proposition offered as the right thing to consider would eo ipso act as a premise in one's reasoning. We can agree that (Cond) is not the right thing to consider, because it is neither about entailment nor about reasoning or norms. But the failure of (Cond) as the right thing to consider should not be taken to signal the failure of any proposition to be the right thing to consider. This would require further argument.
Furthermore, from the mistaken proposal of adding (Cond) as a premise we should not infer that any acceptance (knowledge, belief) of a proposition is to be characterised as acceptance of a premise. This too would require further argument. To my knowledge these arguments have not been properly articulated, and Carroll's Regress has simply been taken as having provided that argument or as having been suggestive enough. But I do not see that it has.
The case for logical cognitivism crucially rests on there being propositional knowledge of logical principles where these are not premises in reasoning, but rather play another role in our cognitive economies. Ponens enables me to arrive at that truth. This suggests that the best way to think of knowledge of Modus Ponens is as knowledge that enables reasoning, or enables reaching certain goals, rather than as knowledge that motivates to reason. This does not require non-cognitivism about Modus Ponens unless we insist that all cognitive states inevitably turn out to be premises or
